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WHITE HABITS, ANTI-RACISM, AND PHILOSOPHY AS 
A WAY OF LIFE
Kenneth noe
AbstrAct: This paper examines Pierre Hadot’s philosophy as a way of life in the 
context of race. I argue that a “way of life” approach to philosophy renders intel-
ligible how antiracist confrontation of racist ideas and institutionalized white com-
plicity is a properly philosophical way of life requiring regulated reflection on 
habits—particularly, habits of whiteness. I first rehearse some of Hadot’s analysis of 
the “way of life” orientation in philosophy, in which philosophical wisdom is under-
stood as cultivated by actions which result in the creation of wise habits. I analyze 
a phenomenological claim about the nature of habit implied by the “way of life” 
approach, namely, that habits can be both the cause and the effect of action. This 
point is central to the “way of life” philosophy, I claim, in that it makes possible the 
intelligent redirection of habits, in which wise habits are more the effect than simply 
the cause of action. Lastly, I illustrate the “way of life” approach in the context of 
anti-racism by turning to Linda Martín Alcoff's whiteness antieliminativism, which 
outlines a morally defensible transformation of the habits of whiteness. I argue that 
anti-racism provides an intelligible context for modern day forms of what Hadot 
calls “spiritual exercises” insofar as the “way of life” philosophy is embodied in the 
practice of whites seeing themselves seeing as white and seeing themselves being 
seen as white.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the philosophy of race, Charles Mills frequently laments professional 
philosophy’s tendency to fetishize abstract theory so utterly that it becomes 
little more than a conceptual refinement factory operating with analyses so 
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granular as to risk losing touch with more pointed macro issues of norma-
tive social life in concreto (Mills 1998, 2005, 2014a). In a New York Times inter-
view with George Yancy, Mills draws attention to this disciplinary trend in 
the context of post-Rawlsian social and political philosophy, observing in 
summary fashion that “Rawls himself said in the opening pages of A Theory 
of Justice that we had to start with ideal theory because it was necessary for 
properly doing the really important thing: non-ideal theory, including the 
‘pressing and urgent matter’ of remedying injustice. But what was originally 
supposed to have been merely a tool has become the end in itself; the pre-
sumed antechamber to the real hall of debate is now its main site” (2014b). 
The worry is that philosophy’s focus on abstract theory is not just drawing 
philosophical attention away from the more fluid and organic contexts of 
lived experience. More specifically, this cloistering of philosophy from the 
often fraught and messy business of actual social realities ends up promot-
ing the kind of cultural opacity the discipline lays claim to combat—in this 
instance, curbing discomfort-producing analysis of the reasons as to why, 
despite the common refrain of post-Civil Rights racial progress, society’s 
levers of power remain thoroughly racialized.
His point is not that we should wholesale dispense with ideal theory 
but that in the course of its professionalization, philosophy has become a 
microcosm reflecting morally problematic trends in the broader context 
of democratic liberalism. Ideal theory has slipped all too easily into the 
role of a bourgeois escapism. “Within the geography of the normative,” 
Mills observes, “ideal theory functions as a kind of white flight. You don’t 
want to deal with the problems of race and the legacy of white supremacy, 
so, metaphorically, within the discourse of justice, you retreat from any 
spaces worryingly close to the inner cities and move instead to the safe and 
comfortable white spaces, the gated moral communities, of the segregated 
suburbs, from which they become normatively invisible” (2014b). Ideal 
theory has become in part a form of ideology, which in the context of race 
we can define stipulatively as a network of group-specific and codependent 
ideas and institutions that simultaneously prescribe and purportedly justify 
the enforcement of morally problematic forms of differential racial privi-
lege (1998, 2005, 2014a). As one racial group (consciously or otherwise) 
exploits another racial group by partitioning along racial lines such baseline 
requirements for material freedom as educational opportunities, access to 
housing and credit markets, legal standing, environmentally healthy spaces, 
and so forth—“ideology,” in this sense, describes a ready-to-hand stock of 
psychologically habitual patterns of normative rationale necessary to main-
tain the privileged advantages of the dominant group. While Mills has more 
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recently taken up the language of “epistemic injustice,” his point remains 
essentially the same. In that context, ideal theory proceeds by mapping a 
white social and political imaginary, utilizing the language of race neutral-
ity, which then functions to prop up via economic and legal mechanisms 
what is in fact a racially nonneutral white experience of a fair and just 
society (in Mills’s coinage, the ideal “whitopia”) (2018, 45).
In short, philosophy’s fetishization of ideal theory obfuscates normalized 
mechanisms of white complicity in the not-to-be-spoken de facto racial order 
by abstracting from what is in fact a racially selective experience, selectively 
treating historically promoted white experience as a qualified candidate on 
which to base a purportedly representative socio-political imaginary and 
subsequent roadmaps for prescriptive redress. Though Mills is not without 
his critics (e.g., Boettcher 2009), his claim nevertheless speaks to a broader 
long-standing need for mainstream professional philosophy to stage an insti-
tutional intervention involving a self-critically race-conscious evaluation of 
unquestioned philosophical habits—habits which have limited mainstream 
philosophizing to mostly white interests. Indeed, lest philosophy continue 
to ignore its passive complicity in signaling and tacitly promoting the racial 
status quo, it risks dooming its relevance to increasingly diverse societies as 
a discipline worthy of material investment.
While Mills and others propose in a somewhat broad fashion that phi-
losophy should redress this issue by more deliberately integrating racially 
charged, nonideal analyses into its intellectual and professional matrices, I 
would like to gesture along a complementary albeit distinctive trajectory by 
drawing on some philosophical lessons from French historian of philosophy 
Pierre Hadot, whose work traces a common theme in the ancient traditions 
of Western philosophy in which philosophy (philo-sophia) is taken to be less 
a specialized theoretical discipline than an overarching way of life. In what 
follows, I argue that a “way of life” approach to philosophy renders intel-
ligible how antiracist dedication to confronting racist ideas and white com-
plicity is a properly philosophical way of life requiring regulated reflection 
on habits—particularly, habits of whiteness. I first rehearse some of Pierre 
Hadot’s analysis of the “way of life” orientation in philosophy, in which 
philosophical wisdom is understood as cultivated by actions which result in 
the creation of wise habits. I analyze a phenomenological claim about the 
nature of habit implied by the “way of life” approach, namely, that habits 
can be both the cause and the effect of action. This point is central to the 
“way of life” philosophy, I claim, in that it makes possible the intelligent 
redirection of habits, in which wise habits are more the effect than simply 
the cause of action. Lastly, I illustrate the “way of life” approach in the 
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context of antiracism by turning to Linda Martín Alcoff’s whiteness antiel-
iminativism, which outlines a morally defensible transformation of the hab-
its of whiteness. I argue that antiracism provides an intelligible context for 
modern day forms of what Hadot calls “spiritual exercises” insofar as the 
“way of life” philosophy is embodied in practices of white racial self-con-
sciousness in which whites see themselves seeing as white, see others seeing 
them as white, and see themselves being seen as white.
2. HABIT AND HADOT’S “WAY OF LIFE” PHILOSOPHY
Initially, one might be skeptical of an attempt to marshal Hadot’s “way of 
life” philosophy in the context of antiracism on the grounds that it might 
end up reinforcing rather than confronting dispositions of whiteness. On 
many occasions, Hadot’s depictions of the way of life approach to philos-
ophizing—as variably “the soul’s serenity,” “the simple fact of existing,” 
“the pleasure of existing,” “pleasure derived from contemplating nature,” 
“the soul’s immateriality;” “the transcendence of the soul with respect to 
the body,” the claim to the “attitude of wonder at that which appears and 
occurs is the present instant,” implying “the entire universe” in a single 
moment, “To see a World in a Grain of Sand / And a Heaven in a Wild 
Flower” (Hadot cites William Blake), subverting the banality of existence 
with a “cosmic perspective,” and so on—all point toward some sort of 
mystical unity in the purity of the true self and the cosmic “totality of the 
world” (Hadot 1995, 60, 87, 88, 99, 101, 260–61). Consider, too, Hadot’s 
claims to the effect that philosophy as a way of life provides for us to 
become “citizens of the world” (Philo of Alexandria, cited by Hadot), to 
acquire “peace of mind (ataraxia)” and “inner freedom (autarkeia),” to live “in 
the present moment,” “letting ourselves be neither troubled by the past nor 
worried by the uncertainty of the future,” allowing us “to accede cosmic 
consciousness, by making us attentive to the infinite value of each instant, 
and causing us to accept each moment of existence from the viewpoint of 
the law of the cosmos” (85, 265, 268).
The problem here is that, generally speaking, such transcendent mus-
ing tends to slip into the more earthbound ideological service of dubious 
faux-spiritualist tropes, which aim neither for a transformation beyond the 
subject’s mere immediate feelings nor a shift in one’s natural tendencies to 
uncritically adjust to the world as it already is rather than attempt to change 
it. Just as corporate tech firms in Silicon Valley appropriate Buddhist med-
itative practices, not toward a critique of the effects of capitalism on lived 
experience, of course, but as a set of psychological tools for inner-directed 
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self-management in the service of productivity maximization (Rao 2018)—
so too can self-absorbed white liberals turn to the mystery-laden esotericism 
of “ancient wisdoms” as a palliative to the inevitable ennui and associated 
existential crises resulting from white ways of life typified by suburban flight, 
purposive wealth accumulation, the collective shunting of risk to racially 
othered communities, consumerist entitlement, and the luxury of colorblind 
indifference. In effect, such modern day white appropriations appear on the 
scene in time to complement the well-documented material proliferation of 
anxiety-relieving drugs among the white middle- and upper-classes.
Now before I am accused of punching up what is an obvious strawman 
of Hadot’s text, what I have tried to do above is to sketch and to warn 
against a tenuous version of the “way of life” philosophy as filtered through 
the habitually selective parameters of ordinary, unspoken white privilege, 
which, as the less refined raw material to professionalized philosophy’s 
propensity to ideal theory, finds in philosophy as a way of life a reaffirmed 
commitment to abstract freedom, triumphant self-interest based individ-
ualism, and white normative entitlement to spaces—arguably the central 
ideological prescripts of white colonial conquest and modern day neoliber-
alist subject formation. Indeed, the more speculative moments of Hadot’s 
readings of the ancients lend themselves to such a selectivity. Metaphysical 
claims about the soul’s ascent to the universal One, the equation of Being 
with the Good, the ultimate Beauty of the totality of the cosmos, and 
the inward-directedness of freedom and peace of mind merge seamlessly 
with abstract, white philosophical pretenses of both lay and professionalized 
orders. As Mills argues:
White (male) philosophy’s confrontation of Man and Universe, or even Person 
and Universe, is really predicated on taking personhood for granted and thus 
excludes the differential experience of those who have ceaselessly had to fight to 
have their personhood recognized in the first place. Without even recognizing that 
it is doing so, Western philosophy abstracts away from what has been the central 
feature of the lives of Africans transported against their will to the Americas: the 
denial of black humanity and the reactive, defiant assertion of it. (1998, 9)
In the spirit of Mills’s critique of philosophy as ideal theory, then, the 
question becomes: How can philosophy as a way of life be made relevant 
to marginalized groups whose daily experiences often seem to suggest little 
to no confirmation of the truth of the kinds of speculative philosophizing 
which characterize the white traditions which are most associated with it?
In what sense does the “incommensurable value of existence” have 
meaning for racially targeted black males, for instance, whose lives are 
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beset by the Kafkaesque panoptics of white gazes and the white gaslighting 
of black perception so utterly that, for example, driving while black, walking 
while black, indeed, being while black, necessitate the kinds of demoralizing 
behavioral adaptations intended to mitigate what is in fact the all-too-stark 
possibility of life-threatening consequences stemming from white anxieties 
in the presence of black bodies? Consider George Yancy’s phenomenology 
of the white gaze, which describes what he calls “the elevator effect,” that 
is, the encounter of a black body and a white body in an enclosed space in 
which the black body perceives the white body perceiving the black body 
in the ways of whiteness: “Independently of any threatening action on my 
part, my Black body, my existence in Black, poses a threat. . . . It is as if my 
Black body has always already committed a criminal deed. . . . My dark body 
occludes the presumption of innocence” (2017, 19–20). A case in point: in 
an illuminating video interview with Al Jazeera, James Badue recalls a friend 
who, while driving, was known to “sticky” his license and registration each 
on opposite sides of the steering wheel in order to prevent having to reach 
into the glove compartment or his pockets when pulled over by law enforce-
ment. “That eliminates the thought process and fear that the policeman 
might have,” Badue reasons, “so we’re going based off the fear that they 
have” (Takruri, 2017). “Why do we have to live in an ‘am I gonna live 
or survive’ kind of state, that kind of mentality?,” he continues. “Can you 
imagine that? You know who does that? People in a war. They live with 
that mentality when they’re on a battlefield. Live or die. Why do I have to 
do that, [while] driving?” Indeed, if the “totality of [one’s particular] world” 
includes centuries of enslavement; subproletarian labor; racially precluded 
access to housing, credit markets, and educational opportunities; narratives 
of black pathology (e.g., color-coded ascriptions of a priori criminality and 
white presumptions of black guilt); and the systemic downplaying and/or 
outright white erasure of these facts from national consciousness—how can 
one be expected to take philosophically seriously the notion that the mere 
fact of being is itself worthy of splendor, let alone entertain in any serious 
way the ultimate unity and rational harmony of the universe?
In truth, the deeper meaning of Hadot’s way of life philosophy lies in the 
urgency it claims for reflecting on the deepest habits constituting the self in 
its relationship to its world. As such, I have found the notion of habit to be 
a most useful concept through which to trace how Hadot synthesizes a uni-
fied methodology across the “way of life” schools of philosophy—namely, as 
each starting from the premise that human beings, while (ideally) thinking 
beings possessed of rationality, are also (nonideally) creatures of habit sub-
ject to constitutive social influences, which unconsciously press on the mind 
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and naturalize, for better or worse, received opinion, popular wisdom, wide-
spread behaviors, and so-called common sense. Naturally, human beings do 
find themselves carried along through everyday life by their habits, which 
free up the mind to pass over mundane details and engage more complex 
activities requiring the deliberate, intentional focus of conscious attention. 
At the same time, however, humans also find themselves to be the prisoners 
of habit, ensnared by routine, and spiritually longing for novelty in a world 
that seems ever more quantified, automated, and bureaucratized.
In light of this duplicity, Claire Carlisle tracks a stark disagreement 
among Western philosophers concerned with whether habit is ultimately 
a positive or a negative force in human life (2014, 2–3). On the one hand, 
philosophers such as Descartes, Kant, and Bergson argue that habit is a 
source of error (Descartes), or a subverter of the autonomy required by duty 
(Kant), or a reducer of life to mechanical routine (the source of the comic) 
(Bergson). On the other hand, philosophers such as Aristotle and Hume 
argue that moral virtue is the offspring of habit, that through habit moral 
virtues are cultivated and integrated in a life that can be, on the whole, 
judged to be good (Aristotle), or that habit is “the great guide of human 
life,” that which confers order and predictability on the world (Hume). For 
the former group, unreflective habit is impulsive and overzealous, while 
intentional judgment is deliberate and carefully weighed; for the latter 
group, habit is stable, swift, and certain, while active judgment lags behind, 
growing wearing in habit’s wake, and unable to act having exchanged time 
and efficiency for an all-too-cautious due diligence. A double interpretation 
of habit becomes manifest, one in which habit is a deadening, unreflective 
force, while at the same time the very principle of embodied intelligence, 
the means by which we tether points of stability in a world of flux; habits 
are developed and sedimented, as well as loosened, unraveled, and poten-
tially transformed in a complex, differential relationship of self and world. 
Accordingly, habit is both “a blessing and a curse,” Carlisle suggests, akin 
to the Greek pharmakon—a drug that can serve as both a poison and a cure 
(2014, 5).
Yet, Carlisle also notes, rather in passing, that “habit can be both the 
source and the result of action,” which points to a complex relationship of 
habit to the causality of thought and action (2014, 7). While she leaves this 
point unexplored in detail, its implication for grasping the significance of 
the way of life philosophy is profound. Consider the following: whenever 
one acts out of habit, the habit can be said to cause one’s action; but at the 
same time, each time one acts out of habit the habit is thus reinforced and 
thereby recreated in one’s action, in which case the habit can be said to be 
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the effect of one’s action. Whenever I say “um” out of habit, for instance, my 
habit of saying “um” causes me to say “um”; yet the very act of my saying 
“um” out of habit further entrenches my habit of saying “um,” and in that 
way (re)creates the habit of saying “um” as the effect of the repeated act 
of saying “um.” In this sense, habits are not strictly causal but one might 
say quasi-causal, in the sense that while they can come to rigidly determine 
one’s thoughts and actions, they can also be isolated and redirected through 
conscious attention and deliberate effort, whereby they become the willed 
effect, not simply the unreflective cause, of action.
Hadot’s references to the role of habit alludes to such a phenomeno-
logically informed understanding of the self as constituted by the habits it 
accrues through its environmental and social interactions (1995, 135, 257, 
284). “To be a philosopher,” Hadot says, “implies a rupture with what the 
skeptics called bios, that is, daily life, when they criticized other philosophers 
for not observing the common conduct of life, the usual manner of seeing 
and acting” (57). “The philosopher lives in an intermediate state,” Hadot 
continues, “between the domain of the habitual and the everyday, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the domain of consciousness and lucidity” 
(103). “Philosophy, for its part, deepens and transforms habitual perception, 
forcing us to become aware of the very fact that we are perceiving the world, and 
that the world is that which we perceive” (253). In short, to do philosophy 
is to “create habits” (86) or “good moral habits” (101). Correspondingly, we 
see in Hadot’s work the pursuit of wisdom itself as predicated on something 
like such a quasi-causal ontology of habit outlined above. Wisdom, in this 
sense, would thus be conceived as an activity aiming at the creation of wise 
habits, such that, as I am suggesting, wisdom requires habits to become 
more so the critically refined effect of one’s actions than strictly speaking the 
merely accrued cause of them. To quote William James: “The great thing, 
then, in all education, is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our 
enemy. It is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease upon 
the fund. . . . The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over 
to the effortless custody of [habit], the more our higher powers of mind 
will be set free for their own proper work” (1950, 122, emphases removed). 
For better or worse, the body accumulates habits long before a conscious 
mind emerges to, if ever, reflect on them. To ask after whether one’s habits 
are merely the cause of what one thinks and does or whether they are the 
effect of one’s deliberate inner-directed attention to oneself is to engage in 
a nonideal and naturalized “ethics of habit,” as James calls it—an ethics 
which acknowledges and begins from the embodied nature of cognitive and 
social life, starting with the role of the nervous system and the plasticity of 
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the body’s neurological functioning as it takes in and calibrates information 
from the surrounding world, most often without one’s conscious awareness.
The issue, of course, is one of self-knowledge. Most often the normalized 
associations of one’s habitual thoughts are not easily traceable to a final, 
particularly discrete source but are in fact imbricated among a plurality of 
seemingly infinite flows of events, institutional practices, uses of language, 
and arrangements of socio-political authority and economic power. Indeed, 
human beings are not only creatures subject to the determinate causality of 
the physical world but are also subject to the world of thoughts and ideas. 
The extent of one’s control over one’s self and way of life by dint of reason’s 
apparent access to an ideal imaginary of thoughts, principles, and ideas pre-
figuring the individual can be said to be a major unifying theme of Western 
philosophy, including but not limited to the ancients. Spinoza, for instance, 
imagines not only a continuum of anonymous and preindividual matter in 
the universe but also a corresponding continuum of anonymous and prein-
dividual thought in the universe, specific conjunctions of which persons exist 
as modifications. William James seems to imply something similar when he 
argues that the Cartesian deduction of a self-grounding cogito is mistaken in 
that at best all we can really infer is something closer to what is meant by 
“it thinks” (not “I think”), in the sense of “it is raining,” where the indexical 
“it” has no strictly specifying referent; there is no determinately existing self 
that is deducible from the mere event of thought’s occurrence, and noth-
ing warranted beyond the claim that thought simply goes on (1950, 225). 
Or consider Nietzsche’s strikingly phenomenological claim that a thought 
comes when it wants, not when I want it to (1968, 214). As he meditates in 
one of his late notebooks, “[a] thought . . . comes up on me—where from? 
How? I simply don’t know. It comes, independently of my will, usually 
surrounded and obscured by a mass of feelings, desires, aversions, and also 
other thoughts. . . . Just who does all this—I have no idea, and I am surely 
more a spectator than originator of this process” (2003, 34). As the ancients 
discovered long ago, persons are at least as much passive selves constituted 
by thought as they are, in turn, active selves freely capable of both inner 
examination and outwardly directed social critique.
On my view, then, the prescription to be drawn from Hadot’s “way of life” 
philosophy consists of first turning inward to take stock of one’s habitual train 
of mental processions whose existence, let alone provenance, are not ordinarily 
prima facie obvious to oneself, then subsequently turning outward to discover 
the external sources of one’s now socio-historically contingent identity. In 
any case, whether, as Nietzsche suggests, persons are spectators to their own 
thoughts or not, the kind of social ontology required for the nonideal theorizing 
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of actually functioning racial ideologies might in a similar fashion posit an 
ontic continuum of preindividual thought, yet here not interpreted as some 
sort of cosmic thought flow but as grounded in more specific socio-cultural 
logics. The thinking being of actually embodied persons in this sense would 
not be adequately captured by a theoretically transcendent viewpoint sub specie 
aeternitatis but instead would require necessarily immanent and nonideal phe-
nomenological analyses of agents’ socially structured embodied consciousness.
3. INVERTING THE WHITE GAZE AS A “SPIRITUAL 
EXERCISE”
Presently, such perspectives are those of racialized communities and the insti-
tutionalized habits that comprise their respective ways of life. In such contexts, 
however, the thinking mind and the sources of its mental furniture are in all 
appearances sought to be kept anonymous by operations of power invested in 
keeping mental activities working in the service of the predominant ideology. 
By dint of a manufactured anonymity, the mind’s racialized associations take 
the form of an illusorily natural and universally distributed “common sense” 
(doxa); yet in truth this anonymity is not some unanalyzable self-grounding 
universality but in fact becomes increasingly transparent to the racially “woke” 
mind as it tracks the production of racist ideas in mythologically functioning 
racial ascriptions operating at institutional levels (through the white family, the 
white church, the white educational system, the white media, the white legal 
system, and so on). What is uncovered are processes of racialization, processes 
which are in effect redacted anonymously by a mostly unspoken yet de facto 
global pattern of socially conferred blessings and curses on the basis of color 
and the unchecked complicity of the system’s unduly privileged beneficiaries.
James Baldwin captures the deanonymizing phenomenological distancing 
of whites from themselves perhaps better than anyone. In “The White 
Man’s Guilt” he tracks the white discomfort and incoherent stammering 
that so often accompanies encounters of whites with the fact of their own 
whiteness. Such is the awkwardly familiar phenomenon of the white 
impromptu proliferation of psychologically defensive utterances intended to 
negotiate, rather than admit, the racialized truth—drawn from what could 
be symbolized as a white rolodex of deflective clichés anonymously filed 
and stored within white collective consciousness for on-the-spot reference.1 
In Baldwin’s words:
1 Through survey and analysis of white people’s responses to racially pointed questions. 
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s sociological studies on race and racism can be read as tracking such 
implicit, and explicit, ideological commitments on behalf of whites (2017 [2003]).
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The nature of this stammering can be reduced to a plea: Do not blame me, I was 
not there. I did not do it. My history has nothing to do with Europe or the slave 
trade. Anyway, it was your chiefs who sold you to me. I was not present on the mid-
dle passage. I am not responsible for the textile mills of Manchester, or the cotton 
fields of Mississippi. Besides, consider how the English, too, suffered in those mills 
and in those awful cities! I also despise the governors of southern states and the 
sheriffs of southern counties, and I also want your child to have a decent education 
and rise as high as his capabilities will permit. I have nothing against you, nothing! 
What have you got against me? What do you want? (Baldwin 1998, 723–24)
Indeed, most whites know full well that racial mythologies are, philosoph-
ically speaking, bullshit. I employ this term, in a Baldwinist spirit, in the 
sense outlined by Harry Frankfurt in his famous essay “On Bullshit,” where 
“bullshit,” as distinct from lies, is defined as speech or action which exhibits 
a lack of concern for the truth (1988, 125). In this sense, the deanonymizing 
confrontation of a white person with his or her own whiteness turns out 
to be a philosophical test of nothing less than one’s very commitment to 
truth and reality. Baldwin concludes: “One can measure very neatly the 
white American’s distance from his conscience—from himself—by observ-
ing the distance between White America and Black America. One has only 
to ask oneself who established this distance, who is this distance designed 
to protect, and from what is this distance designed to offer protection?” 
(1998, 725). For white people, then, the propaedeutic to confronting this 
color-coded “image of thought” (to borrow from Gilles Deleuze) involves 
instituting a racially conscious self-interrogation as to the degree of one’s 
own complicity in the socially engineered and by-design hidden (to whites) 
sources of one’s white thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and default responses to 
raced perceptual stimuli. In short: making one’s socialized habits of white-
ness transparent to oneself.
Shannon Sullivan (2006, 2014), Terrance MacMullen (2009), Alia Al-Saji 
(2014), and Helen Ngo (2017) have each offered distinctive treatments of 
the habits of whiteness and the habits of race more generally. Drawing 
resources from classical American pragmatism, notably the philosophy of 
John Dewey, Sullivan and MacMullen expose the illusion reinforcing white 
anonymity that white subjectivity is discontinuous with its overtly racist 
past. What makes habit such a useful explanans of whiteness, according 
to Sullivan, is that whiteness is not something (for the most part) overtly 
promoted among contemporary whites but subtly signaled and absorbed 
via social institutions, unconsciously “seducing” white bodies to psychoso-
matically accrue and accept the social privileges associated with it (2006, 
67). A mutually reinforcing transactional relationship thus obtains between 
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white bodies and the institutions that produce them, whereby whiteness 
and its privileges are produced by signaling institutions and the latter are 
reinforced by seductive privileges unreflectively taken for granted by whites. 
In a similar way, MacMullen describes the white body as a “vessel” of white 
habits, habits which he observes are in fact destructive of white commu-
nities, producing resentment, numbness, emptiness, and a general sense of 
self-alienation and guilt (2009, 5, 2). On that score it is also worth noting 
physician Johnathan Metzl’s recent Dying of Whiteness (2019), which analyzes 
case studies in Missouri, Tennessee, and Kansas to show how the politics of 
racial resentment create contexts of “backlash governance” correlated with 
generally negative health outcomes in white communities, such as increas-
ing suicides, falling life expectancies, and rising dropout rates.
Al-Saji develops what she calls “a phenomenology of hesitation” in which 
racialized habits are brought forth to the conscious mind in moments of 
interruptive bodily hesitation. She argues that affects are key to disrupting 
perceptual habits, since merely thinking about one’s habits is not enough 
to change them. What is necessary, she suggests, is the creation of spaces 
that will bring forth the affects needed to force the body to perceive in new 
ways. Continuing in this vein, Ngo discusses the Unheimlichkeit (“uncanni-
ness”) of racialized embodiment. Yet while black bodies captured by white 
gazes live an uncanny feeling of not-being-at-home, even as “inhabitual,” 
Ngo’s analysis discloses the possibility of turning the discussion back around 
on white complicity, where she observes that there is a particular danger of 
being too much at home, “such that one stops encountering others and fails 
to consider what it is like to be herself in the eyes of another” (2017, 105, 
108). The experience of racial alienation in the case of whites can be pro-
ductive, Ngo’s analysis suggests, as it creates the conditions for which whites 
can confront the fact of their own whiteness and begin to see themselves 
seeing as white and seeing themselves being seen as white, thus disrupting 
(or in Al-Saji’s words, forcing a “hesitation” of) white habits. At a collective 
level, one would hope, such a deanonymizing of whites to themselves might 
begin to plant the seeds for a potential unity of whites and nonwhites in 
antiracist struggle (108).
What I am suggesting, however, is that the way of life philosophy can 
push further into the phenomenology of whiteness beyond an analysis of the 
habitual privilege of whiteness to the morally implicating complicity that such 
bodily and sensory habits exemplify and reinforce.2 Moreover, it might be 
2 On the distinction between “privilege” and “complicity” I am indebted to informal 
conversations with Brad Elliott Stone for his insight that the latter, not the former, better 
captures the morally implicating habits of whiteness.
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said that such a shift in whiteness discourse from the abstract acknowledge-
ment of white privilege to the more viscerally lived discomfort of white 
complicity is in truth the moment at which antiracism can begin taking 
shape as a philosophical way of life for whites, beyond an argument/ 
evidence-driven acceptance of the truth in acknowledged word toward an 
existential embracing of the truth in practiced deed. After all, nothing moti-
vates action like the felt reality of the potential consequences of one’s own 
morally imbued entanglements, if only for the cruder reasons of first-person 
self-interest.
To the extent that one is moved by rational argument, however, it is no 
doubt due to its existential impact, not simply the validity of the relationship 
of premises to conclusion. It is here that, we should note, John Cooper’s 
critique of Hadot’s “existential” interpretation of the way of life schools is 
thoroughly mistaken (2012, 18–19). The former’s criticism amounts to a 
claim against Hadot for allegedly downplaying the role of rationality and 
argument in the way of life schools in favor of a more fundamentally nec-
essary “existential option” when aligning oneself with a particular set of 
philosophical ideas (18). “One’s ‘option’ for any one of these philosophies in 
particular, far-reaching as the consequences might be for one’s way of life,” 
Cooper writes, “does not deserve to be called an ‘existential’ one. The only 
existential option involved is the basic commitment to being a philosopher, 
to living on the basis of philosophical reason” (19). What is so striking about 
this criticism is that a philosopher of such seasoned caliber would fail to 
understand, let alone argue otherwise, that reasons can be profoundly existential, 
especially as pertains to one’s core sense of selfhood (as is the case with 
race); on the contrary, pace Cooper, I would suggest that reasons are indeed 
essentially so, as I see little in the way of evidence warranting the claim that 
anyone’s habits were ever transformed through rational argument alone 
without it also having tapped into something of existential significance.
Yet Cooper’s misgivings amount to more than a merely semantic quib-
ble over “reason” and “existential,” for, if we follow him, they affect how 
“spiritual exercises” are to be understood, which he describes as nonrational 
(20). Indeed, it is one thing to criticize and in part reject Hadot’s interpre-
tation of the ancient schools on the grounds that it imports anachronistic 
language of Christian spiritualism and mistakenly ascribes it to philosophy 
in classical antiquity, but it is quite another to conclude on those grounds 
that the way of life schools took philosophy to be more a cognitive and 
intellectual practice than “spiritual exercises” might connote. In Hadot’s 
words, on the contrary:
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It is a concrete attitude and determinate life-style, which engages the whole of 
existence. The philosophical act is not situated merely on the cognitive level but 
on that of the self and being. It is a progress which causes us to be more fully, 
and makes us better. It is a conversion that turns our entire life upside down, 
changing the life of the person who goes through it. It raises the individual from 
an inauthentic condition of life, darkened by unconsciousness . . . to an authentic 
state of life, in which he attains self-consciousness, an exact vision of the world. 
(1995, 82–83)
Cooper’s description of spiritual exercises as “meditation, self-exhortation, 
memorization, and recitation to oneself bits of sacred text, causing in one-
self devoted prayerful or prayer-like states of consciousness and mystical 
moments” (22) is therefore a very limited understanding of what we should 
have in mind. Such an understanding of spiritual exercises lends itself to 
some sort of quasi-religious introspection—which Cooper seems to be aim-
ing at in order to criticize as nonrational—and misses the broader point of 
the way of life philosophy, which, on my view, is both rational and exis-
tential: the socially grounded self-examination and active transformation 
of culturally accrued habits of body and mind shaped by socially injurious 
ideological commitments.
As such, the way of life orientation in philosophy offers resources appro-
priate to an antiracist ethos, an enterprise itself both rational and existential. 
In particular, Hadot’s discussion of Bergsonian philosophy of perception in 
“The Sage and the World” injects into the way of life approach a sober 
analysis of the roles of phenomenology and art in fostering and promot-
ing self-critical subjective comportments that would expand one’s natu-
rally selective inner awareness and outer perceptual fields (1995, 252–54). 
Indeed, the epistemic role of habit in the collective racialization of subjec-
tivities is exhibited in, as Mills has it, “a consensual hallucination” whereby 
“white misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception” 
become “the most pervasive mental phenomena of the past few hundred 
years, a cognitive and moral economy psychically required for conquest, 
colonization, and enslavement,” requiring “a certain schedule of structured 
blindness and opacities in order to establish and maintain the white polity” 
(1997, 18–19). Mindful reflection on the “mass of feelings, desires, aver-
sions” of which Nietzsche speaks as clouding a clear view of the sources 
of one’s mental habits begins with, as Bergson says, “an extension of the 
faculties of perceiving” (2007, 113). It is not so much that whites simply see 
the world differently from nonwhites but, more specifically, that whites see 
the world in limited and selective ways stemming from the social luxury of 
not having to see how race connects up with lived realities created by an 
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unrelentingly adaptive history of white racist policy and silencing of dissent. 
The attitude of colorblindness, so culturally valorized, turns out not to be 
the virtue it is so often claimed. Normative racial guidelines such as “one 
shouldn’t see color” in fact reinforce ideologically functioning perceptual 
blockages shaping the parameters of what whites are able to see of the 
world and of themselves and, consequently, end up setting limits on what 
whites are able to accept as the truth and the reality of the historically sed-
imented de facto racial order. Linda Martín Alcoff puts the problem in an 
appropriately blunt manner: “White children are systematically taught to 
become delusional” (2015, 84).
Yet interest in “whiteness” seems to be on the rise, especially in Western 
democracies. White people appear to be feeling the gaze of their nonwhite 
peers with increasing intensity, as more and more social scrutiny is levied 
on the historical events, policies, legal constructions, and informal back-
drops of complicity by which whiteness has come to secure a synonymy 
with power. New concepts have emerged as scholars attempt to capture 
and explain the surge of white anxiety and backlash against newly emer-
gent calls for white racial responsibility, including “white fragility,” coined 
by Robin DiAngelo (2018) and “white rage,” coined by Carol Anderson 
(2016) to describe the affective thrust at the center of whites’ reactionary 
attempts to disenfranchise the black vote, weaponize identity politics in the 
service of establishment power, and otherwise roll back what racial progress 
has been made. Ibram X. Kendi’s observation that racial progress actually 
moves along two tracks, one of antiracist progress and the other toward the 
adaptation and reinscription of racism, is useful here. His epic Stamped from 
the Beginning: The Definitive History of Racist Ideas in America demythologizes the 
notion of racial progress by tracking through American history the simulta-
neity of antiracist resistance and adaptive racist backlash. “That’s not to say 
that antiracist reformers have not made progress in exposing and burying 
racist policies over the years. But racist reformers have made progress too. 
. . . [A]s Americans have discarded old racist ideas, new racist ideas have 
constantly been produced for their renewed consumption” (2016, 8, 507). 
From slavery to emancipation, from Jim Crow to Civil Rights, from police 
brutality and mass incarceration to Black Lives Matter, white self-interest, 
Kendi observes, has proven an unrelenting galvanizer in economics, poli-
tics, legislation, education, and virtually all facets of institutional life in the 
United States, adaptively reproducing increasingly subtle forms of discrim-
ination. Tacit white support through a widespread condition of what we 
might call “white incontinence” (akrasia) could help explain the historically 
persistent failure of the efforts of moral suasion.
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This has led some to advocate the wholesale eradication of whiteness in 
order to achieve an antiracist society. After all, it is one thing for whites to 
stage, at an individual level, an inner-directed analysis of their own hab-
its of complicit whiteness but quite another to institutionalize a collective 
outcomes-based assault on disparity-producing public policies that embody 
the whiteness problem and generate the very individuals whose identity, 
their very existential sense of selfhood, is based on the maintenance of 
race-based privileges. Indeed, as psychologist Bobby Wright once claimed, 
“Everywhere one finds Whites and Blacks in close proximity to each other, 
whether it is Chicago or Zimbabwe, the Whites are in control,” an “extraor-
dinary universal phenomenon which defies every known statistical law of 
probability. . . . [I]n their relationship with the Black race, Europeans 
(Whites) are psychopaths and their behavior reflects an underlying biolog-
ically transmitted proclivity with roots deep in their evolutionary history” 
(1984, 2). “Behavioral scientists generally agree that there is no known cure 
for the psychopath. . . . Therefore,” Wright concludes, “since Blacks are at 
war with psychopaths, violence is the only way” (12). Does antiracism as a 
philosophical way of life entail the elimination of “whiteness”?
In The Future of Whiteness, Alcoff argues against what she calls an “elim-
inativist” tendency within discussions of whiteness, that is, the notion that 
since whiteness is inextricably defined by its historicity, and that its history 
consists of a virtually irredeemable past of exploitation, oppression, the 
valorization of individual self-interest, the commodification of the natural 
world, and entitlement to spaces on the basis of racially ascribed subordi-
nate status, an ideal essence of whiteness can be gleaned from this seem-
ingly inalterable tendency of white collectives toward their racial others 
(2015, 117). On the contrary, Alcoff suggests, whiteness, as a social iden-
tity, is subject to the same general structures of historical production, and 
thus deconstruction, which apply to all identities. Her argument rejects 
the “white exceptionalism” presupposed by the eliminativist—that is, “the 
thesis that whiteness is so qualitatively distinct from other social identities 
that it can never mingle or harmonize,” implying “an essential and fixed 
meaning of whiteness” predicated on a simplified historical genealogy of 
whiteness as de jure equivalent to white supremacy (2015, 117). Her point 
is that if we are to take seriously the notion that identities are socially real 
(that is, not biologically real nor fixed essences), then they are thus subject 
to potential shifts in meaning as social conditions change.
Accordingly, it is philosophically slipshod to allow presumptions of the 
fixed nature of whiteness to slip into the analysis and hence conclude that 
whiteness operates somehow independently of the de facto shifting material 
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conditions of identity production (such as religious persecutions, famines, 
economic exploitation, and other historical and ongoing events). Of course, 
this is not to enlist dubious arguments to the effect that “whites were 
enslaved too,” or other sorts of claims which assert a false equivalency of 
whites with groups oppressed by white majorities. What a transformation of 
whiteness does entail, according to Alcoff, is the initial production of “white 
double consciousness,” which as the white correlate of W. E. B. DuBois’s 
famous analysis from The Souls of Black Folk (2018, 7), captures the would 
be lived experience of whites’ existentially conflicted and/or outright con-
tradictory sense of self upon recognizing the truth of their complicity in the 
white racist past of which they and their previous generations have been the 
historical beneficiaries (Alcoff 2015, 128).
In a key chapter, entitled “Spiritual Exercises,” Hadot raises the question 
of how it is possible to practice spiritual exercises in meaningful ways today, 
given the radically different contexts which distinguish modernity from its 
past (1995, 108). While he does not provide much in the way of a detailed 
answer, what I am suggesting, in a new direction, is that the inner-focused 
practice of white self-examination is one form that contemporary “spiritual 
exercises” finds an intelligible context, specifically regarding the necessary 
steps toward an openness to racial discomfort that such a project entails. 
Phenomenologically, this will involve seeing the world in a new way—or 
perhaps better, seeing the world for the first time with eyes now racially 
attuned. “If Seneca speaks of stupefaction,” Hadot writes, “it is because 
he sometimes finds that he discovers the world all of a sudden. . . . At 
such moments, he becomes conscious of the transformation taking place 
in his perception of the world. Normally, he had not been in the habit of 
seeing the world, and consequently was not astonished by it. Now, all of a 
sudden, he is stupefied, because he sees the world with new eyes” (1995, 
257). In the context of racial self-consciousness, these words take on a new 
meaning—no longer the discovery of how small and insignificant one is in 
the grand scheme of the infinite cosmos, for instance, but the existentially 
uncomfortable and morally implicating discovery of how through the very 
fact of one’s white racial assignment—what we might call, in the spirit 
of Heidegger’s Dasein, one’s “racial thrownness”—one has accrued social 
advantages complicit in white supremacist systems.
While admittedly stretching the letter of Hadot’s “spiritual exercises,” 
it is nevertheless clear enough that such inner examination of white con-
sciousness is congruent with the spirit of the way of life philosophy, insofar 
as it applies the practice of perceptual expansion to white consciousness, 
privilege, and complicity, thus creating a productive alienation of whiteness 
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from itself and from the cultural forces which enable whiteness’s man-
ufactured naturalization and anonymity. In this sense, the white gaze is 
thus inverted, turned inward, and utilized in the antiracist service of racial 
self-consciousness: whites seeing themselves seeing as white, seeing others 
see them as white, and seeing themselves being seen as white.
4. ANTIRACISM AND THE COURAGE OF TRUTH
Accordingly, philosophy as a way of life becomes a commitment to truth 
for truth’s sake, where antiracist truth is iterated, in the language of Hadot, 
as a “spiritual” act of courage by nonwhites and whites alike against the 
forces of culturally sedimented racist habits and institutionalized white com-
plicity. Philosophy cannot go it alone, of course; public policy is needed 
in concert with cultural interventions, including honest deep-diving studies 
of the white family, white religious organizations, and white educational 
institutions, the racial wealth gap, and so forth. House bill H.R. 40, which 
seeks to publicly fund a study of the legacy of slavery and possibilities for 
reparation, as well as Mehrsa Baradaran’s recently proposed Homestead 
Act for the 21st Century are steps in the right direction.
Given white reactionism, however, white and nonwhite antiracists must 
continue to demonstrate courage. Yet, on the other side of the color line, 
such self-reflective exercises in the context of antiracism are nothing new—
though here whiteness is confronted externally, and the way of life phi-
losophy takes the form of self-preparation in the event of white backlash. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the context of the American Civil Rights 
movement, in which philosophy as a way of life finds exemplary analysis, 
famously, in Martin Luther King Jr.’s 1963 “Letter from a Birmingham 
City Jail” (1991). There, King outlines the steps necessary for the nonviolent 
confrontation of racial injustice, which includes a phase of “self-purifica-
tion” in preparation for what is to come when negotiation is refused. James 
Lawson’s 1959 nonviolence workshops, inspired by Mohandas Gandhi’s 
philosophy of satyagraha (“holding on to truth”), also demonstrate such anti-
racist philosophical spiritual exercises. Participants, as John Lewis recalls, 
fortified themselves for verbal and physical attack by staging “little sociodra-
mas, taking turns playing demonstrators and antagonists . . . [playing] angry 
bystanders, calling us niggers, cursing in our faces, pushing and shoving us 
to the floor”—eventually putting to practice antiracist philosophy as a way 
of life by taking it to segregated lunch counters (Ackerman and Duval 2000, 
315). To be sure, it is no accident that W. E. B. DuBois, Alain Locke, King, 
Lawson, Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, Huey Newton, Angela Davis, 
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and others all held advanced degrees in philosophy, or at least made phi-
losophy a significant foundation of their educations. More recently, projects 
such as Cornel West’s “prophetic pragmatism” and Kristie Dotson’s work 
on black feminism and epistemic violence further this long-standing conti-
nuity among African American philosophers who take philosophy to be in 
the service of addressing social issues. Such projects merge with the “way of 
life” antiracist philosophy advocated here.
Leonard Harris’s conception of an “insurrectionist ethics” gives its own 
role to philosophy in combating systemic racism (1999, 2002, 2013). Harris 
departs from King and Lawson in emphasizing rebellion, insurrection, and 
the justified demand for violence to overthrow systems of oppression when 
moral suasion and/or nonviolent resistance (inevitably?) fails. On this view, 
thoroughly embedded systems of oppression such as institutionalized racism 
create oppressive contexts, the destruction of which requires insurrectionist 
agents possessed of contrary moral intuitions, character traits, and reason-
ing strategies than those commonly emphasized by dominant approaches 
to ethics, which tends to emphasize detached rationality, civility, restraint, 
compassion, humility, etc. Well-intentioned calls for civility, restraint, and 
patience in fact serve to suppress cries of moral outrage and existential 
despair. Indeed, because traditional paragons of Aristotelean virtue are 
often weaponized against those who of urgent necessity struggle to secure 
their dignity and humanity in the face of its normalized denial (“be patient, 
justice will one day prevail,” “be less emotional and people will take you 
seriously”), traits such as audacity, tenacity, aggressiveness, enmity, indig-
nation, and guile become the model for adversarial insurrectionism against 
silent adjustments to injustice. The point is that traditional moral frame-
works that emphasize impartial rational deliberation and associated charac-
ter virtues of the mean between the extremes are often counterproductive 
to ethical action in light of socially sanctioned yet routinely ignored degra-
dation and the debilitating effects of normalized oppression.
Thus in the spirit of David Walker (1796–1830), John Brown (1800–
1859), and Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862), Harris argues that in such 
contexts moral action requires dramatization, forceful demand, and the 
strategic channeling of rage. “The metaphorical reincarnation of Walkerian 
[i.e., insurrectionist] character traits,” he suggests, “are appealing—tenac-
ity, irreverence, aggressiveness, self-assurance, self-confidence, enmity, and 
passion—because they help make possible the sort of advocacy and author-
itarian voices that demand liberation of the enslaved” (2002). Expanding 
on Harris’s argument, Lee McBride extracts four general pillars, which 
standardize the main tenets of insurrectionist moral action: a willingness 
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to defy norms and convention when they perpetuate injustice, a critical 
universal conception of personhood (not its mere habituated assumption), 
the acquisition of universal liberation in light of personhood, and the rec-
ognition of insurrectionist character traits necessary to push back (McBride 
2017, 228–29).
We see a similar spirit in the work of Jane Elliott, whose “blue eyes/
brown eyes” exercise has been confronting whites with their own whiteness 
for over forty years. In A Collar in My Pocket (2016), Elliott reflects on her 
decades of experience leading groups of individuals of all ages, racial back-
grounds, and genders through a social experiment that divides groups by 
the color of their eyes. Intentionally placing those with green or blue eyes 
in a subjugated group position (such eye color is more commonly associated 
with persons deemed phenotypically white) in relation to the other brown-
eyed group, Elliott’s experiment targets accrued habits of whiteness, to quite 
lively effect.3 The idea is that the experience will provide for a transforma-
tion of one’s racial awareness and associated habits of mind by disclosing to 
participants, through their own experience, what it is like to be the recipient 
of arbitrarily grounded differential treatment and be the subject of gaslight-
ing when one stands up to it. Historically, her work continues an oft-unspo-
ken though woefully exceptional tradition of allyship from white women 
who take great pains to act for the veracity of racial equality—in the spirit 
of precursors such as Prudence Crandall (1803–1890), Margaret Crittendon 
(1822–?), and Mrytilla Miner (1815–1864) (see Davis 1983, 102).
While examples can be multiplied, the point is that such figures such as 
Walker, Brown, Thoreau, King, Malcolm X, Davis, or Elliott are not just 
“activists” possessed of a zealous passion for social change but philosophers in 
the way of life mold, demonstrating a willingness to put life and limb on the 
line for truth and reality. And while it is beyond the scope of the present arti-
cle, placing the above instances into comparison raises the important question 
as to whether a way of life approach, whether that envisioned by Hadot or 
perhaps some other incarnation past or future, should be committed abso-
lutely to nonviolence or whether certain contexts of institutional oppression 
are so deeply sedimented as to necessitate insurrectionist modalities of oppo-
sition that would justifiably take the form of organized violent resistance.
In any case, truth is not about making (white) people comfortable. 
Antiracism as a philosophical way of life necessitates white discomfort, not 
3 In 2009, Elliott’s experiment was the subject of a Channel 4 documentary, in which 
psychologists were employed to analyze the behavior of the whites in the subjugated group. 
The documentary can be viewed online: https://www.youtu be.com/watch ?v=6MYHB 
rJIIFU.
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merely for the sake of provoking “white guilt,” but, as King says, “Like a boil 
that can never be cured as long as it is covered up but must be opened with 
all its pus-flowing ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice 
must likewise be exposed, with all of the tension its exposing creates, to the 
light of human conscience” (1991, 295). This will not be without considerable 
difficulty, yet there is historical and sociological evidence that institutional 
habits and the habits of individuals are co-constitutive. Consider, for instance, 
the antismoking campaigns of the 1990s, the resulting decline of smoking 
in subsequent youth, and the resulting increases on restrictions on use and 
taxation of tobacco, which gained traction with greater ease over time. While 
racism is a much more existentially penetrative issue and has proven itself 
relentlessly adaptive to redress, the transactional back and forth between 
public policy and the attitudes and beliefs of individual persons whereby each 
has its turn in constituting the other provides a broad outline for conceiving 
solutions. Thus, there is good reason to believe that whites seeing themselves 
as white, seeing others see them as white, and seeing themselves being seen 
as white can have a positive impact on public policy and state governance.
On the intellectual front, white philosophy instructors and their white 
students, including white philosophy majors and white graduate students, 
will have to make a significant effort to see the world through a glass non-
whitely, against the fetishization of ideal theory as philosophy’s standard 
operating procedure. White philosophers must interrogate themselves as 
to what actually comes to mind when we say “we,” “us,” and “everyone” 
and become racially self-conscious when using such language in the context 
of teaching philosophy. My own work teaching philosophy at an HBCU 
has taught me as much, especially in the context of teaching philosophy 
as a way of life to students of color, so many of whose racialized experi-
ences have taught them, as the proverb goes, that “When white people say 
‘Justice’ they mean ‘Just us.’” If philosophy as a way of life has anything 
to teach whites on the antiracist front, it is that truth requires inwardly 
directed racial self-examination as much as outwardly directed social cri-
tique. As Frederick Douglass’s autobiographical reflections remind us, we 
come to know the world in part by turning inward and knowing ourselves; 
there’s nothing more philosophically “way of life” than that.
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